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 The Humanitarian War against Migrant Smugglers at Sea
Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli
ABSTRACT
This paper engages with the military-humanitarian technology of migration 
management from the vantage point of the European Union Naval Force 
Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) “Operation Sophia”, the naval and air force 
intervention deployed by the EU in the Central Southern Mediterranean to disrupt 
“the business model of human smuggling and trafficking” while “protecting life at 
sea." We look at the military-humanitarian mode of migration management that 
this operation performs from three vantage points: logistics, with a focus on the 
infrastructure of migrant travels; subjectivity, looking at the migrant profiles this 
operation works through; and epistemology, building on the mission’s first stage 
of intelligence and data gathering. Through this multi-focal approach, we 
illuminate the productivity of this military-humanitarian approach to the migration 
crisis in the Mediterranean.
 
Introduction 
On June 23, 2015, the EU launched its first military operation of migration 
management, targeting the smuggling and trafficking of people from Libya to the 
EU. Deployed in the Southern Central Mediterranean, the military operation is 
tasked with intercepting, seizing, and diverting vessels suspected to be carrying 
migrants. In other words, the goal is to govern a migration route by targeting the 
material infrastructure of crossing, namely the informal economy of ferrying 
people to the European shores, and the vessels through which these trips are 
carried out.1
The EU Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) Operation Sophia was 
issued at the 2015 peak of the migration crisis. In June 2015, in fact, more than 
100,000 people had crossed the Mediterranean seeking refuge in Europe since 
the beginning of the year, while over 1,830 had been reported dead as they took 
the unseaworthy, extremely expansive, and only passage out of war and violence 
available to them, i.e., the smugglers’ ride across the Mediterranean Sea (Achilli 
and Sanchez 2017). Meanwhile the EU was struggling to reach an agreement to 
relocate as few as 40,000 asylum seekers across all its member states, while 
Middle Eastern and Northern African countries had received over four million 
Syrian refugees,  a situation that led United Nations rights-chief Zeid Ra'ad Al 2
Hussein to call upon the European Union to take “bolder steps,” as he put it, to 
address the crisis.   3
The EU military operation was presented as one of such bolder steps. It opened 
with the dispatch of five warships, two submarines, three planes, three 
helicopters and two drones and ignited a polarized debate about the “migration 
crisis” in the Mediterranean. Issued in the aftermath of yet another tragic 
shipwreck in which about 900 migrants were lost at sea,  the Operation was 4
presented by EU authorities as an intervention to “save” migrants from perilous 
waters and from pitiless traffickers and smugglers,  and as a “response”—indeed 5
the humanitarian response—to the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Critics 
instead contended that the EU was waging “war against migrants,” that the 
military disruption of “the business model of human smuggling and trafficking,” as 
EU documents had it, meant warfare against migrants.  
In this paper we take a different approach. More than evaluating the 
humanitarian mission against the military operation (or the other way around), we 
hold on to the military-humanitarian nexus  that this operation articulates in order 6
to study its productivity and to map its outcomes on the government of mobility. 
Methodological approach: The military-humanitarian nexus
What is at stake for us is neither humanitarianism nor war per se but migration 
management through a military-humanitarian technology, and particularly its 
spatial productivity. Methodologically, this means that we do not engage the 
humanitarian predicament and the military deployment of Operation Sophia as 
known units or discrete opposites—as if the militarization of humanitarianism or a 
humanitarian agenda of military interventions were somehow dichotomous 
assemblages. 
Instead, our interest is directed toward the geography of military-humanitarianism 
that Operation Sophia stages: how does a military-humanitarian approach to 
migration management impact on migrant journeys across the Mediterranean 
Sea? And how does this military and humanitarian co-implication reconfigure 
migration management’s battlefields and humanitarian territories? 
The engagement of the EU military in border security and human rights issues is 
no news. It is part of the growing role of the EU as a military actor working on 
security missions, which has occasionally also featured a migration chapter.  7
Operation Sophia, however, recasts migration management as a priority of the 
EU military engagements. 
In this paper we study this evolution through a multi-focal approach that 
interrogates the spatiality of the mission: what are the outcomes of the Operation 
for migrant mobility and for the actors involved? How does this operation impact 
migration across the Mediterranean while at the same time reconfiguring 
migration management through a military-humanitarian technology? 
We try to answer these questions from three different angles. First, we look at the 
logistics of the operation, i.e., its focus on the infrastructure of migrant journeys, 
also comparing EUNAVFOR MED to previous episodes of the military-
humanitarian government of migration and particularly to the Italian Navy’s Mare 
Nostrum Operation (2013-4). Building on a critical geography approach our study 
of “Operation Sophia” brings a spatial engagement to the growing conversation 
about the “humanitarian border” carried on in other disciplines (Walters, 2011; 
Cuttitta, 2014 and 2015; Vaughan-Williams, 2015; Pallister Wilkins, 2015) and, to 
a lesser extent, in geography (Williams, 2014; 2015) In particular, our work 
contributes an attention to the logistics of the humanitarian frontier: first by 
looking at the logistics of migrant journeys as they become the target of a 
military-humanitarian operation of migration management; and, second, by 
looking at the logistics of military-humanitarianism—its deploy, protocols, and 
outcomes. 
Building on what Deborah Cowen poignantly called “logistics spaces” (Cowen, 
2014), we study Operation Sophia’s outcomes on smugglers’ ferrying of migrants 
across the Mediterranean, illuminating the workings of military-humanitarian 
spaces of rescue and migration control. We are interested both in the military-
humanitarian logistics that Operation Sophia enlists for the government of 
refugees at sea and in how this intervention impacts on the organization of 
migrant journeys—in other words, we look at “logistics spaces” of both military-
humanitarianism and smugglers’ ferrying activities. 
It is important to clarify that the focus on migration and logistics does not 
correspond to a functionalist view of the border regime. On the contrary, our 
contribution highlights that military-humanitarian spaces are unstable battlefields, 
where refugees’ desire to reach Europe, smugglers’ ferrying activities, and 
military-humanitarian interventions against the smugglers’ business result in 
contested geographies of escape, control, and rescue. 
Second, we read the military-humanitarian nexus in terms of the subjectivities it 
shapes and posits as targets of government, also comparing Operation Sophia 
with the other EUNAVFOR engagement, i.e., Operation Atalanta, the EU counter-
piracy mission off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean, launched 
in 2008 and which served as a model for “Sophia”. In this regard it is important to 
stress that we take subjectivities in the plural, in order to bring attention to the 
multiplicity of migration profiles that are produced and targeted by a military-
humanitarian approach to migration management. Most importantly, cautioning 
against the risk of an ontologization of migrant subjectivity, we look at the 
processes of subjectivation ignited by military-humanitarianism, and map how 
migrants are depicted both as “risky subjects” and as “subjects at risk” (Aradau, 
2004).
Processes of subjectivation remain under-explored in geographic approaches to 
the study of migration. Migrant subjectivity, in fact, tends to be conceived as the 
agency that underpins the spatial struggles at the center of geographers’ 
attention. In this capacity, subjectivity is assumed as the starting point of the 
analysis and posited as a subject positions. Migrant subjectivity also features in 
spatial analyses through the study of the normative profiles which b-order 
migrants’ turbulent geographies. Our work has certainly contributed to this 
second conversation (2013a and b, 2016, and forthcoming [with DeGenova]). 
Here however we are interested in taking a different approach to the study of 
migrant subjectivity. In particular, we are interested in studying the Operation 
Sophia’s predicaments about migrants’ subjectivity and mapping the discursive 
spaces that military-humanitarianism produces as it profiles its interventions’ 
targets. In other words, we are interested in the use of migration profiles as one 
of the technologies of the military-humanitarian re-organization of migrant 
journeys. 
Third, we look at the epistemological component of the mission, focusing on the 
mission’s first stage (concluded at the time of revising this article) of intelligence 
and data gathering, and building on the conversation about the role of epistemic 
communities in the reconfiguration of migration control as management (Geiger 
& Pécoud, 2013; Garelli & Tazzioli, 2013; De Genova, Mezzadra, & Pickles, 
2014). 
A methodological clarification is due. We write on an a very contested, still 
unfolding, and highly unpredictable political process, i.e., the first of its kind EU 
military-humanitarian operation targeting the economy of migrant smuggling 
which epicenter is the politically unstable Libyan context. This means confronting 
the methodological challenge that emerges in the attempt to critically evaluate 
and unpack the outcomes of the Operation when the main available sources 
about it are governmental documents produced to promote it. 
As academic researchers, in fact, we lack the skills for an embedded observation 
of the smuggling industry in Libya, as well as the clearance to conduct participant 
observation of Operation Sophia’s operations. Given these limitations, the 
methodological challenge we tried to overcome concerned how not to get stuck 
in the governmental narratives of Operation Sophia (e.g., the military arm 
enlisted to fight the humanitarian tragedy, the EU “response” to the migration 
crisis) and instead retain our interest in mapping the spaces of military-
humanitarianism the Operation enlists and reconfigures.  
In order to confront this situation, our research design combines different 
approaches to data collection: interviews with the EUNAVFOR militaries and 
Italian Navy officials overseeing the planning and command of the Operation ; 8
interviews with border enforcement officials who have been working in Italian 
piers for several years, also before Operation Sophia was launched; analyses of 
official and the leaked documents about EUNAVFOR MED; interviews with NGOs 
and activists involved with migrant issues and working in the central and 
southern Mediterranean; and analyses of Operation Sophia circulated through 
the Watch the Med Alarm Phone  newsletter. 9
In sum, our contribution maps the different and overlapping spaces of 
governmentality that Operation Sophia opens up: the material spaces of migrant 
crossing and migration control (logistics), the political geographies of migratory 
profiles (subjectivities); and the epistemic spaces of information flows 
(intelligence).
 
Logistics:  Disrupting a Business, Seizing Vessels, Re-routing Protection
Critics of Operation Sophia focused on condemning the militarization of a 
humanitarian crisis that the EU Naval Forces performed. As a result, the field of 
governmental intervention posited by the Operation has been left problematically 
under-researched. “Disrupting the business model of human smuggling and 
trafficking”—the official aim of Operation Sophia (EU NAVFOR 2015)—is, we 
contend, one of the new military-humanitarian approaches to the government of 
migration. In this section we unpack the framing of migrant travels’ “business 
model” as the target of the military-humanitarian intervention and follow 
Operation Sophia’s spatial outcomes on migrant journeys and on the agenda of 
migration management.  
Let us briefly situate our interest in business models and transport logistics as the 
new targets of the military-humanitarian approach to migration control. Enlisting 
military operations in the name of protecting life is a deep-rooted tenet of 
humanitarianism (Barnett, 2012; Fassin and Pandolfi, 2010; Orford, 1999, 2003). 
And of course when the EU Naval Forces are deployed in the Mediterranean as 
“part of our effort to save lives”—as the official message put it the day of the 
mission’s launch—this humanitarian agenda (as well as its military arm) gets 
reiterated. Operation Sophia, however, adds an economic predicament to the 
military-humanitarian assemblage of migration management, i.e., the 
predicament to “disrupt the business model” of migrant travels. 
So how does the military-humanitarian government of migration work when its 
intervention is bestowed with an economic rationality and when the business 
model of smuggling and trafficking migrants becomes the target of the military-
humanitarian intervention? 
“The aim of this military operation is to undertake systematic efforts to 
identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used or 
suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers.” (EU 
NAVFOR 2015) 
To seize its target, Operation Sophia directs naval and air warfare against 
smugglers’ and traffickers’ informal fleet. In fact, as the initial surveillance and 
assessment phase of the Operation has concluded (as of September 2015) 
gathering information on how smugglers’ networks operate, the operation will 
now focus on the actual seafarers and the very infrastructural assets used for 
ferrying people across the Mediterranean. The goal will be the “search and, if 
necessary, diversion of suspicious vessels,” and “the disposal of vessels and 
related assets, preferably before use.” (EU NAVOFOR 2015). The Resolution 
adopted by the UN Security Council on October 9, 2015 offers a political backing 
to EUNAVFOR MED Operation and clarifies that “member states are called to 
inspect and seize “vessels that they have reasonable grounds to believe have 
been, are being, or imminently will be used by organized criminal enterprises for 
migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya”(United Nations, 2015).
We cannot yet comment on actual operations of vessels’ seizure, disposal, and 
eventual disruption since the operation is still underway. While the operation only 
recently moved beyond the data gathering phase to become fully operational on 
the logistics of migrant travel, its goal was already clear at the planning stage: 
Operation Sophia aims to produce a “humanitarian” blockage of migrants and 
refugees in transit countries like Libya. By stopping and eventually destroying the 
means of transportation at origin, the Operation results in the attempt to close off 
the last and only “escape route” (Papadopoulos et al, 2008) left to people fleeing 
war, famine, and persecution—a dangerous, violent, abject escape route 
(Amnesty International, 2015) but the only one available to them in the current 
EU regulatory framework. 
This military-humanitarian preventative border (Garelli, 2015) builds on one of the 
EU staples for migration management, i.e., its approach to migration containment 
through the externalization of border work to third countries, outside the EU 
territory. In this military-humanitarian enactment, however, the EU vision for off-
shore containment comes to an apex and ends up corresponding to the attempt 
to produce a full-fledged blockage. It is important to underline that the blockage 
of migrants and refugees in countries of transit has been one of the assets of the 
EU approach to migration management in the Mediterranean region in the post-
Arab Uprisings era (Garelli & Tazzioli, 2017) and is also part of the 2015 
European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015: 3), which was 
presented only a few days before news of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia 
reached the public eye via journalistic leak.   Situating this operation as a 10
military-humanitarian enactment of a larger EU strategy of migration governance 
is an important critical move.
Building on this overview of the Operation’s role in the EU migration 
management strategy, we now turn to a close examination of its focus on 
logistics. Destroying the vessels used for ferrying people across the 
Mediterranean, the EU strategy contends, will prevent shipwrecks and hence 
“protect human life.” But how is protection delivered and what type of protection 
is enacted by this military-humanitarian operation? More than providing 
protection, we argue, Operation Sophia achieves a displacement. More precisely, 
it displaces the site of death-risk for migrants and refugees. The intended 
outcome is in fact to remove the risk of dying from the doorsteps of Europe in the 
Mediterranean Sea (where the risk is undoubtedly high but where search and 
rescue missions are deployed ) to Libya where abduction, sexual violence, and 11
abuse against migrants and refugees are the rule (Amnesty International, 2015). 
Moreover, such military-humanitarian preventative protection actually infringes on 
the freedom for anyone to leave any country and obstructs individuals’ access to 
international protection. Hence, the preventative intervention against possible 
shipwrecks results in the attempted blockage of a migration route. 
In short, the humanitarian regime  flips over. Instead of working as the selective 12
mechanism that grants access to international protection to some migrants, the 
humanitarian regime becomes an instrument for preventing migrants’ and 
refugees’ arrivals to the European shores. In this sense, the humanitarian regime 
contributes to the “migrantization”  (Tazzioli, 2015) of asylum seekers in a place 
of abjection—either in Libya or in some other neighboring country. Hence the 
distinction between economic migrants and refugees that grounds the 
government of mobility and its regulations is erased by the military-humanitarian 
move that Operation Sophia stages. To be more precise: the subject of the 
humanitarian regime, the refugee, is made-disappear through the military-
humanitarian attack on the economy of smuggling and finally further 
“vulnerabilized” as a migrant stuck in a dangerous transit country.
In this regard, EUNAVFOR MED opens a new chapter in the military-
humanitarian approach to migration management in the Mediterranean. Whereas 
the Italian Mare Nostrum Operation  approached the migration crisis “in search 13
and rescue mode,” intervened in suspected distress situations, and mainly 
brought those it rescued across shore to Italy, Operation Sophia instead enters 
the scene of the crisis “in combat mode,” fighting smugglers in the name of 
protecting migrants, but finally aiming to prevent migrants from crossing the 
Mediterranean Sea into Europe.  14
So from Mare Nostrum to Operation Sophia, in the span of less than two years, 
the military-humanitarian predicament of protecting migrants and refugees has 
shifted terrain in several ways. First, it has re-territorialized protection: from 
disembarkation in Italy upon rescue to the blocking of departures with the alleged 
goal to prevent shipwreck, what we would call “preventative rescue 
enforcement.” It has also lost specificity in terms of juridical profiles: from the 
asylum seekers and repatriated migrants of Mare Nostrum to the blocked 
potential asylum seekers of EUNAVFOR MED. Finally, the military-humanitarian 
approach progressively abstracts away from refugees and migrants themselves 
in the passage from Mare Nostrum to Operation Sophia. The direct engagement 
with bodies to be rescued from shipwrecking boats (as per Operation Mare 
Nostrum) now switches into Operation Sophia’s military-humanitarian attack on 
smugglers’ boats and assets “preferably before use,” as the policy document puts 
it. 
Indeed, migrants are the unexpectedly absent figures in the military-humanitarian 
planning of Operation Sophia. The migrant ship is instead the main target of a 
military action aimed at dismantling the logistics of migrant crossing. Policy 
documents about the Operation, in fact, seldom talk about migrants and are 
instead “populated” by boats and vessels to identify and seize. In other words, 
naval and aerial efforts are all directed towards identifying and fighting networks 
of smugglers and traffickers and migrants are rarely mentioned when the 
dynamics of the mission are illustrated (e.g., as possible victims of “collateral 
damage” during the military-humanitarian intervention). Their “safety” is finally 
posited as the indirect outcome of a destructive action undertaken against 
smugglers’ ferrying business.
A war on smugglers’ vessels goes a long way in terms of public and political 
support. Presenting his work on “viapolitics” William Walters recently suggested 
that “certain vehicles function as visual operators in what is emerging as one of 
the most significant developments in migration politics, namely the 
humanitarianization of migration control.” (Walters, 2014: 8; emphasis added). 
The rickety, overcrowded, and unseaworthy boat has certainly become the icon 
of the “Mediterranean migration crisis”: first, it stages a humanitarian tragedy 
while it conveniently erases the EU’s own visa politics that forces people onto 
these boats in the first place; second, it fixes the risk of death at the moment of 
crossing while glossing over the politics these people are running away from and 
are forced to face when they decide to take a chance on a boat. 
Vessels played a key role as part of the political marketing for the operation also 
in another way. Illustrating the need for a military-humanitarian intervention, 
politicians talked about the need to save migrants and refugees “from the 21st 
century slave trade” of organized human trafficking (e.g., Mogherini, 2015). So 
migrants and refugees were portrayed as slaves traded by traffickers across the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
Such portrayal seemed to call for a military-humanitarian intervention: in an 
uncanny historical manipulation, migrant vessels were posited as slave ships and 
the activity of smuggling migrants across the Mediterranean as the transatlantic 
slave trade. Yet, the fact that risking their lives at sea is the only way out of 
certain death at home is the outcome of the institutional violence of European 
migration politics. The network of smugglers is the response to the EU visa 
politics of border-deaths. In other words, crossing the Mediterranean through 
smugglers is an illegalized border crossing on the way to refuge in the absence 
of legal and safe means of escape, an absence that allows a market for the 
services of the smuggler to emerge (Costello and Giuffre’ 2015).
 
Subjectivities: Unruly Conducts and Governmental Action
From Pirates to Migrants: The Continuum of Unruly Conducts
Operation Sophia’s economic re-assemblage of military-humanitarianism may be 
best illuminated by looking back at the history of the European Union Naval 
Force (EUNAVFOR) and reflecting on the economic matrix of its operations. 
Operation Sophia, in fact, is shaped after EUNAVFOR “Operation Atalanta,” the 
counter-piracy military mission off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian 
Ocean. Still underway, the mission started in December 2008 with the aims of 
protecting Somalia-bound humanitarian shipments from pirates’ actions, 
disrupting piracy and armed robbery at sea, and safeguarding fishing and 
commerce in the area.  15
When Operation Sophia was launched in 2015, its continuity with Operation 
Atalanta  was simultaneously a key asset for its institutional support and the 16
target of harsh political criticism. On the opponents’ front, the radical discontinuity 
between the two operations’ targets, i.e. pirates on the one hand and migrant 
smugglers on the other, became the tenet of arguments against the legitimacy 
and competency of the mission (Faleg & Blockmans, 2015; Vézian, 2015). 
While we certainly share the political preoccupations grounding these positions, 
we however contend that EUNAVFOR introduces an economic parallelism 
between these two groups. Pirates and smugglers are targeted for a military-
humanitarian intervention along the lines of an economic rationale, which 
matches the economic activities of these two very different groups. We are 
interested in investigating the economic space that EUNAVFOR profiles as the 
common ground of pirates’ and smugglers’ activities. Both the piracy trade and 
the migrant smuggling business are highly unpredictable economies that escape 
states’ control and present the challenge of unruly conducts to governmental 
action. As Deborah Cowen eloquently demonstrated in her work on logistics 
(2014), Somali pirates belong to those groups of actors who disrupt the efficiency 
of trade flows and are hence confronted by governmental actions that include the 
military but enlist more complex assemblages than outright warfare. In the case 
of Operation Sophia, such complexity comes in the form of the military-
humanitarian approach to migration management. 
The notion of organized economic groups—the smugglers and the pirates—that 
interject and reroute economic flows with their unruly and unpredictable conducts 
is the gist of the parallelism posited by the EUNAVFOR missions: pirates and 
smugglers become governmental targets along an economic continuum. With 
Operation Atalanta, EUNAVFOR is targeting the action of Somali pirates against 
national economies and the international provision of aid. With Operation Sophia, 
EUNAVFOR is targeting the informal economy of ferrying migrants, which inserts 
an element of unpredictability in the government of the national economies.
Migrant smuggling is a practice that partially escapes states’ control and requires 
multi-layered and complex interventions, along similar lines to what Cowen 
describes for pirates. The government of smuggling in this sense outsteps 
migration management as such and instead aligns with the broader issue of 
governing unruly conducts and populations.  It is this governmental program to 
manage transnat ional movements and populat ions—part “motley 
crowd” (Linebaugh & Rediker, 2000:20) and part “international gangster 
syndicate” (Rediker, 1997)—that marks the continuity  between pirates and 17
smugglers in these two European Naval Forces Operations.   
Smugglers, Migrants, Refugees: the Politics of Military-Humanitarian 
Interventions
The governmental hold on smugglers’ practices is part of a larger territorial 
politics that goes beyond the issue of economic profits—either the gains of 
smugglers’ transnational networks or the economic stability of the nation-states 
these practices infringe upon. To put it simply, what is at stake with this military-
humanitarian operation is the route of the smuggling business, the central 
Mediterranean maritime corridor through which migrants and refugees are ferried 
into Europe.  
In the paper’s second section (“Logistics: Disrupting a Business, Seizing Vessels, 
Re-routing Protection”) we highlighted the border-work performed by the 
humanitarian war against smugglers’ fleets. Here we want to approach the spatial 
politics of the Operation from the angle of the migratory profiles posited as 
Sophia’s military-humanitarian targets. Three groups feature in the Operation’s 
objectives and supporting rhetoric: first, smugglers and traffickers; second, 
migrants themselves; third, potential terrorists hiding among refugees on the 
boats crossing the Mediterranean.  How are these different groups featured as 
part of Operation Sophia’s  military-humanitarianism, or, in other words, as part of 
a belligerent intervention and of a purported action of protection? What are the 
geographies of military-humanitarianism articulated through these different 
targets? 
First we’ll focus on smugglers and traffickers. As these figures are presented as 
the intended offensive aim of the Operation (the disruption of the “business 
model of human smuggling and trafficking” is Operation’s stated goal), they are 
at the same time posited as specific subjectivities targeted for governmental 
action. While they are diligently distinguished in their different profiles in official 
documents, smugglers and traffickers are presented as the criminals of the 
Mediterranean migration crisis and as the threat to vulnerable migrants and 
refugees, whom the Operation will protect by disrupting the business of ferrying 
migrants across the central Mediterranean.  
Operation Sophia is the first EU-wide military initiative directed against the 
business model of smuggling and trafficking. While the economic dimension of 
this target is certainly a distinctive trait of this military-humanitarian technology as 
we argued above, the offensive against smuggling and trafficking is a long 
established field of EU governmental action. It is important to situate EUNAVFOR 
MED in this context to avoid falling into any form of “presentism” (Foucault, 1975) 
that would exceptionalize this Operation, hence loosing track of the policy 
landscape to which it pertains and on which it intervenes. 
Let us briefly reconstruct this genealogy. The EU-declared fight against migrant 
smugglers dates back to the 1990s and early 00s, when an international call for 
fighting smuggling was launched. At the EU level, important normative steps 
were taken to frame smuggling as a crime . In this context, the discussion about 18
the categories of the “smuggler” and the “migrant” grew in academic literature.  19
At the borders of the EU, these conversations resulted in the implementation of 
visa restrictions to regulate the access of certain heavily racialized groups of 
third-country nationals (Van Houtum, 2010) in line with the global approach to 
migration management that was being framed exactly at the beginning of the 21st 
century (Geiger & Pécoud, 2011). The imposition of visas on certain mobile 
subjects resulted in a selective political economy of access. In this context the 
economy of “illegal” smuggling flourished.  
Prior to Operation Sophia, the EU engagement with smugglers had always been 
a sub-set of irregular migration (Koser, 2001): the criminalization of smugglers 
was a product of their facilitating illegalized crossing, in a process where 
migrants were heavily criminalized too. In the context of Operation Sophia, 
instead, smugglers are portrayed as hyper-criminals, both as potential murderers 
of migrants at sea and as heading a lucrative illegal business. 
Second, as for migrants, they are decriminalized and double-victimized as those 
who are either fatally shipwrecked due to the rickety fleet of an informal business, 
or as the vulnerable target of different types of violence perpetrated by 
smugglers. Let us be clear on this characterization: those who have to resort to 
smugglers to flee via the Mediterranean Sea are subjected to all sort of 
violations, including many different forms of violence by the people who organize 
their trips (see, for instance: Amnesty International, 2015). Our analysis highlights 
another layer of violence migrants are targeted for, i.e., the border-violence that 
characterizes visa regulations and access to international protection. As Anna 
Gallagher and Fiona David remark, “the politics of migrant smuggling are also, 
very much, the politics of asylum” since in order to access Europe, asylum 
seekers have to resort to being ferried by smugglers (2014: 12).
Yet, Operation Sophia works through multiple migration profiles, which 
correspond to different military-humanitarian logics. Alongside the decriminalized, 
victimized migrant profile we talked about above, in fact, another characterization 
emerges as part of Operation Sophia’s working logic, i.e., the profile of migrants 
as risky subjects.   
The figure of the vulnerable, shipwrecking migrant has so far been the hallmark 
of military-humanitarianism and supported the deployment of massive search 
and rescue missions, as was the case with Mare Nostrum. Operation Sophia 
introduces a shift in this approach, where the subject whose life is at risk of 
drowning is also (and primarily) posited as a possible risky subject. Such framing 
comes with a reconfiguration of the migration government component of military-
humanitarianism: the interventions is pushed at the pre-frontiers of Europe, 
before people come into the EU member states’ territorial waters’ jurisdiction for 
rescue, i.e., before migrants become shipwrecked lives the EU would need to 
rescue as per international regulations about human life safety at sea.
Third, terrorists are mentioned as one of the threats the military-humanitarian 
Operation protects against. When this target is evoked the characterization of 
migrants as smugglers’ victims is reworked. In terms of juridical profiles, in fact, 
EUNAVFOR MED tends to boost up the figure of the smuggler as “the” criminal, 
while it posits the migrant as the victim that should be protected from smugglers’ 
risky and illegal ferrying. When the protection scope of the Operation touches on 
the goal of protecting the EU (not just migrants), the figure of the foreign fighter is 
evoked, with a strong impact on the migratory profiles of Operation Sophia, i.e., 
from smugglers’ victims to potential terrorists. The contention that terrorist 
criminals may infiltrate the smugglers’ fleet as fake migrants or fake refugees, 
introduces the scenario of hybrid flows in the conversation, and shifts 
EUNAVFOR MED’s protective mission from migrant and refugees’ bodies to the 
territory of receiving countries. Such displacement and territorialization of 
vulnerability is not new in migration management (Catania & others, 2012; Garelli 
& Tazzioli, 2013; Martin, 2011, 2015; Mountz, 2010, 2014); what’s interesting 
here is that the military action is envisaged also as a tool for “skimming” the 
profiles of threatening conducts. 
The military-humanitarian intervention against smugglers and traffickers 
contributes to widening the field of EU states’ action by producing a “gray zone” 
of  military-humanitarian targets—spanning from the fake refugee, to the terrorist 
in migrant disguise, to the trafficker. This is the cornerstone of the EU strategy for 
blocking migrants before departure from
More than simply working through a sharp opposition between migrants and 
smugglers, Operation Sophia contributes, we contend, to “broadening—instead 
of narrowing—the range of subjectivities targeted for a military-humanitarian 
intervention in the field of migration . It is important to underline that it is not the 
illegalization of migration per se that is criminalized in the military-humanitarian 
warfare against the logistics of migrant crossing. We want to suggest that it is 
rather a whole series of “unruly” conducts that are politically sanctioned, 
resembling what Foucault has called “infra-legal illegalities” (Foucault, 2013: 
177) . 20
The figure of the smuggler works as the catalyst for the different subjectivities 
that are posited as targets of Operation Sophia. The smuggler stands for different 
unruly conducts, starting from its own profile of organizer of an illegal and risky 
ferrying business, and extending to fake refugees, and even possible terrorists. 
To put this logic into a formula, it is not only the act of smuggling (someone else) 
that is criminalized but also what could be labeled as “self-smuggling”: fake 
migrants who are actually potential terrorists who try to enter Europe, fake 
refugees who are undocumented economic migrants trying to access the EU 
labor market, or finally “real” asylum seekers who, nevertheless, would be a 
burden for EU member-states and are hence targeted by actions of preventative 
containment. 
Knowledge Extraction: Migration Intelligence, Spying on Migrants, and 
Closing a Migration Route
“Know your enemy!” is the slogan used to summarize some of the continuities 
between the anti-piracy and anti-smuggler operations of EUNAVFOR. As the 
Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) underlines, both operations 
heavily rely on the production of information about their target of action 
(CIMSEC, 2015). According to the article, this intelligence approach to military 
targets is obtained though air observation and imaging; according to our 
fieldwork evidence, military-humanitarian operations in Italy also heavily rely on 
“spying” on migrants, so to speak, i.e., interviewing rescued migrants in order to 
“know the enemy,” to get to know smugglers’ networks and operations.
In the summer of 2015, a few months into Operation Sophia’s first stage of 
“surveillance and assessment” of smuggling and trafficking networks, we had a 
glimpse into the process of knowledge extraction associated with military-
humanitarian technologies, as we observed the EU Border Agency Frontex 
interviewing migrants and refugees upon rescue  at the Pozzallo and Augusta 21
docks.  In Augusta, Sicily, for instance, after migrants had disembarked and 22
were waiting to be escorted to the first aid and fingerprinting stations, Frontex 
agents approached them on the dock, asking about their reasons for being there 
and the details of their travels across the Mediterranean. In Pozzallo we 
observed similar procedures at the first aid center, where the Frontex unit was 
stationed and where a coordination team was in charge of triangulating the 
information gathered in Sicily from migrants with the EU archive of migration 
knowledge.  23
The epistemic component of the government of migration has been widely 
documented as part of the reorganization of migration governance toward soft 
modes of migration management in the Mediterranean (De Genova, Mezzadra, & 
Pickles, 2014; Garelli & Tazzioli, 2013; Geiger & Pecoud, 2013). In this capacity, 
the government of migration acts as a proactive politics, a politics that keeps 
multiplying borders, normative frames, legal statuses, processing practices and 
regulations through different activities of knowledge production (Feldman, 2012; 
Friese, 2012; Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013).  24
The epistemic component of migration management is an expanding field that 
invests initiatives targeting the smuggling business. Information on smugglers’ 
activities has historically been extracted in the context of judiciary inquiries when 
smugglers are arrested and brought to trial. Most recently, intelligence activities 
targeting smuggling are rapidly entering the world of social media, searching for 
smugglers’ online marketing activities to advertise their trip packages (Boyd, 
Musto, 2014). Operation Sophia embodies the military-humanitarian declination 
of this activity, which consists in mapping the economic space and logistics of the 
business of ferrying migrants and refugees across the central Mediterranean 
route. While in policy language and official military documents this component of 
the military-humanitarian operaiton is designated as “intelligence,” “surveillance 
and assessment,” and “data and information gathering,” we propose instead to 
look at it as an operation of knowledge extraction. 
We use the notion of extraction in two senses. First, we refer to the process 
whereby a military-humanitarian technology works on the people it declares to 
save by turning them into informants, and by acting on rescued bodies as 
reservoirs of knowledge to be extracted by an “epistemic power” (Foucault, 
2000). Second, we talk about extraction to point to the economic matrix of this 
process of gathering data and intelligence: as much as extraction is a constitutive 
part of the operations of capital and logistics that characterize capitalism today 
(Gago, Mezzadra, 2016; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, 2017), it is equally at the 
center of a military-humanitarian operation of migration management and of 
operations of governing, channeling, and preventing migratory movements. 
In other words, the warfare on smugglers entails the invention of ways of 
extracting knowledge from migrants in order to sabotage their “illegal” channels 
for accessing Europe. The European Naval Forces will be assisted in this 
operation of “knowledge extraction” by other actors involved with migration in the 
central Mediterranean. A coordination mechanism was established during the first 
phase of Operation Sophia to try to ensure sustainable long-term collaboration. 
Among these actors are: EU member states’ officers; and EU agencies and 
bodies like Frontex, Europol (with its recently launched Joint Operation Team 
“Mare”), Eurojust, and the European Asylum Support Office  (European 
Parliament, 2015).
On a Sicilian dock, in the aftermath of a recently concluded rescue operation, a 
Frontex agent explained the epistemic component of military-humanism in very 
simple words to us during an interview in July 2015: “migrants are like books”, 
the agent stated; and continued explaining that these migrants/books will tell you 
about their journeys, who organizes them, and how.
In other words, migrants are the informants in the military-humanitarian 
intervention staged by Operation Sophia. The disruption of smugglers’ business 
is based on the intelligence and information gathered during the first stage of 
Operation Sophia. In a context where informal networks for ferrying migrants are 
still partially unknown and where the unpredictability and mutability of their 
practices are the rule, having access to the in-depth and geographically-specific 
knowledge of migrants and refugees is key. 
As part of this military-humanitarian approach to migration management migrants 
are victimized as targets of smugglers’ violence (and targeted for rescue from 
them), while they are at the same time vehicles of stories, data, and information 
about the transnational smuggling economy. 
Conclusion 
This paper contributed an analysis of the military-humanitarian reconfiguration of 
migration management in the context of the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. 
Focusing on the EU Naval Force “Operation Sophia” we mapped the impact of 
military-humanitarianism on migrant journeys and on the government of 
migration. 
We showed the economic geography that grounds the military-humanitarian 
engagement of the EU in the field of migration. First, the Operation’s focus on 
disrupting the “business model” of smugglers and traffickers works as a driver of 
public support in the name of rescuing and protecting migrants, while in fact 
resulting in the attempted blockage of migrants in transit countries away from 
Europe. In other words, the economic activity of ferrying migrants becomes the 
pursued target of a military-humanitarian approach to the migration crisis. In this 
context, humanitarianism becomes the framework for refugees’ blockage in 
transit— through measures of rescue-and-capture.
Moreover, our research showed that the EU Naval Force’s military-
humanitarianism is rooted in targeting economic activities that pose a threat to 
the stability of national economies. Tracing the genealogy of EUNAFOR military-
humanitarian operations, we showed how they aim for activities that threaten to 
disrupt the efficiency and predictability of national economies. Finally, our 
analysis showed the migratory profiles through which Operation Sophia works, 
illuminating the different categorizations migrants are depicted through as part of 
a military-humanitarian governmental approach.
In closing, we want to reflect on three considerations we draw from the analysis 
carried out in this paper.
The first is an economic consideration. The military-humanitarian fight against 
smuggling networks does not undermine the “illegal” economy of ferrying people 
across the Mediterranean as such, but, rather, it impacts on the logistic of 
migrant crossing on a particular route. What gets disrupted is not  “the business 
model” of smuggling, as the Operation’s planning documents contend. Instead, 
what gets disrupted is the infrastructure that allows migrants and refugees to flee 
into Europe across the Mediterranean. “Migratory struggles play out not just in 
fixed settings and structures but in and around vehicles, routes and 
infrastructures” as William Walters eloquently put it (2014: 9). The governmental 
“sabotage” of smugglers’ logistics opens another struggle for migrants and 
refugees in relation to their having to overcome yet another border, this time a 
military-humanitarian border, in order to seek rescue and protection in Europe. 
The second consideration has to do with circulation. The warfare on smugglers is 
not a restriction to the general mobility of refugees per se. The target of the EU 
strategy of military-humanitarian containment is not circulation as such, since the 
forced mobility of people to non-European countries is not considered a 
“problem” for the EU, as the EU financial support to Turkey and Lebanon to host 
Syrian refugees demonstrates. Ultimately, Operation Sophia works along the 
lines of other measures of migrants’ preventive containment and even detention 
that the EU is negotiating with third countries. 
The third consideration has to deal with the notion of crisis. The military-
humanitarian government of migration at sea illuminates the epistemic and 
political crises that characterize the current approach to migration across the 
Mediterranean. On the one hand, the functions of warfare and of 
humanitarianism have become entangled, and migration management has been 
reshaped by humanitarian warfare. On the other hand, the EU intervention in the 
Mediterranean crisis has shown that the re-assemblages of migration 
governmentality require an analysis that goes beyond the boundaries of 
academic disciplines. By studying Operation Sophia we sketched an approach to 
the military-humanitarian government of populations on the move and hope to 
see more critical engagement with military-humanitarian approaches to migration 
containment (their extractive geographies, logistics, and biopolitics) within the 
field of radical geography. 
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 The modularity of the Operation’s stages reflects this focus: first, gathering intelligence  on 1
smuggling and trafficking networks; second, search and diversion of vessels suspected to be 
carrying migrants; third, disposal of vessels and other assets used by smugglers, preferably 
before their use.
 At the time of revising this article (October 2015), there are 4,052,723 Syrian refugees in the 2
MENA region: 1,938,999 in Turkey; 1,078,338 in Lebanon; 628, 887 in Jordan; and 247,352 in 
Iraq. Source: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=103 
 Source : http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/un-says-one-million-refugees-3
should-be-no-problem-eu-315413
 On April 18, 2015, a boat sank in the Sicily Channel: 28 people survived, 58 were found dead, 4
and between 700 and 900 are missing. 
 Official documents importantly underline the distinction between smugglers and traffickers and 5
at times even suggest the importance of creating legal paths to migration, albeit only for a very 
restricted group of people. Yet they neglect to underline that it is the EU policy regulating entry 
and asylum that allows for smugglers’ business to flourish.
 The expression “military-humanitarian nexus” refers to an approach whereby military and 6
humanitarian approaches are deployed together in the government of mobility.  Such nexus goes 
beyond the mere coexistence of humanitarian and military techniques. Instead, it refers to the 
productivity of military-humanitarianism, i.e., both humanitarian and military approaches are re-
configured as they are deployed together.
 The EU Border Assistance Missions started in 2005—one in Moldova and Ukraine, the other in 7
Rafah at the border of Egypt and the Gaza Strip— re cases in point. 
 Operation Sophia’s headquarters are in Rome, Italy. The  Operation’s planning and command is 8
under the lead of Italian Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino.
 The Watch the Med Alarmphone is a 24/7 “alarm number” to support rescue operations of 9
boatpeople in distress in the Mediterranean Sea.
Source: http://www.watchthemed.net/index.php/page/index/12
 The EU operation was revealed in early May 2015 by the media organization Wikileaks, the 10
website Statewatch, and the newspaper The Guardian which published and commented on a 
leaked EU document on EUNAVFOR MED presenting the plan “to disrupt the business model of 
the smugglers, achieved by undertaking systematic efforts to identify, seize/capture and destroy 
vessels and assets before they are used…[and] on the high seas” (Statewatch, 2015: 1). 
 It is true that also Operation Sophia also performs rescue operations.  For instance, on July 22, 11
2015 the German ship Werra—part of the EUNAVFOR MED fleet—rescued 211 migrants whose 
boat was in distress in international waters, north of the Libyan coast. However, such rescues 
pertain to the legal obligation any seafarer acting in compliance with international maritime 
regulations; they are not the aim of the military-humanitarian mission.  
 With the notion of “humanitarian regime” we refer to any operation of migration government 12
that deploys human rights as its technology and/or humanitarian rationales as their supporting 
rhetoric. 
 Mare Nostrum is a year-long military-humanitarian operation launched by Italy in October 13
2013, aimed at identifying boats in distress, rescuing migrants, and apprehending human 
traffickers.  The operation rescued about 177,000 people.
 In-between these two operations, stands Triton, the border control operation run by Frontex, 14
which prioritized border enforcement over search and rescue operations.  
 As Amedeo Policante (2015) illustrates, the operation was launched in response to the United 15
Nations’ call for cooperation towards the enforcement of international criminal law in the area. The 
United States created a Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden, while the European 
Council launched the first joint European naval operation to disrupt piracy. Policante importantly 
illustrates that the war on piracy marks a rupture with traditional war, due to the transnational 
dimension of its target.
 The continuity between these two EUNAVFOR operations is evident from the leadership: Rear 16
Admiral Enrico Credendino, the operation commander of EUNAVFOR MED, served as Force 
Commander at the European Naval Forces for Operation Atlanta in 2012.  
 As Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker underline (2000), pirates intend to build counter-17
societies, while smugglers don’t have such a political program. 
 See the “UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air” (2000) 18
criminalizing migrant smugglers. The Protocol is part of the “UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime” (adopted by the General Assembly resolution 55/25 on 15 November 2000) 
where the smuggling economy is officially characterized as a transnational crime activity. During 
the 2000’s, the EU started planning to fight the migrant smuggling economy (Gallagher and 
David, 2014).
 As the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2011) explains, “the 19
conceptualization of smuggling as a migration business was formally developed by Salt and Stein 
in 1997.” 
 It is not the “illegality” of migrant crossing per se to be the object of governmental 20
preoccupation here. Rather—as Foucault sharply pointed out when he analyzed the 19th century 
sanctions against workers—it is a series of “infra-legal illegalities” to be at the center of 
governmental attention. These “infra-legal illegalities” are what is being punished and consist in 
unruly conducts that refuse to stay in their own place (Foucault, 2013: 177).
 In official documents and during our interview with the office of Operation Sophia’s 21
spokesperson (September 2015), the Operation is often described as part of the EU 
comprehensive approach to migration and as triangulating with Frontex. 
 Pozzallo and Augusta are two Sicilian ports where migrants are disembarked upon rescue at 22
sea. Pozzallo hosts a Frontex office in the first aid center (recently renamed hotspot center) and 
is situated in the province of Ragusa. Augusta, on the other hand, is located in the province of 
Syracuse: Frontex agents deployed in Sicily travel to Augusta as needed upon migrants’ and 
refugees’ disembarkation at the Augusta port.
 During an interview with Frontex and Italian police officers at Pozzallo, we were told that the 23
information gathered in Sicily are transferred to EURODAC, the EU-wide system of fingerprint 
databases for asylum seekers and irregular border crossers.
 According to Gregory Feldman, the knowledge practices that are at stake in migration 24
governmentality “become ubiquitous as they are unbound by local constraints […] As such, they 
can standardize and circulate frameworks of meaning that are not tied to place but rather extend 
virtually across space” (Feldman, 2012: 77). Without denying Feldman’s argument, we want to 
stress the non-autonomy of governmental knowledge on migration and its dependence on 
extractive activities (e.g., spying on migrants and smugglers’ actions).
